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I. INTRODUCTION
Structure matters. It drives function, expanding or confining the limits of
use. Legal structure matters in administrative law. Whether we are creating new
legal structures or redefining old ones, changes in laws affecting government
organizations will determine the functions they serve. Sometimes our changes
are made deliberately;. sometimes changes to one area of the law will
inadvertently affect another. Several years ago Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan recommended that responsibility for federal welfare be shifted
from the Department of Health and Human Services to the Department of
Labor. Senator Moynihan was not unhappy with the management of HHS,
nor was he recommending change for the sake of change. His reasons for
the change were more fundamental, more "structural: HHS is in the
business of passing out checks; Labor is in the business of stressing
work."'
In the past two years, the Louisiana Legislature has adopted several
structural changes in Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act ("LAPA").2
Most notably, Louisiana adopted what is known as a central panel or unified
corps of administrative law judges ("ALJs'). The central panel system, which
has been adopted in nearly half of the states and has been proposed for the
federal system,3 has a central agency or office that hires and assigns all ALJs;
the central agency rotates ALJs among agencies to ensure the ALJs' indepen-
dence. Louisiana created the Division of Administrative Law, effective October
1, 1996, within the Department of State Civil Service to employ and manage
Louisiana's ALJs.4 Previously, each administrative agency hired its own
administrative law judges, and the judges worked exclusively for that
agency.
Copyright 1999, by LOuiSIANA LAW REVIEW.
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The arguments for the unified ALJ corps are straightforward.5 AL's who
are employees of the Department of State Civil Service will enjoy greater
decisional independence. No longer will ALJs be subject to hiring and firing,
production quotas, quality-control management, or other supervision by the same
agencies that call upon them for their findings and legal conclusions.6 When
agencies cannot hire or fire ALJs because an agency disagrees with the ALJs
findings and conclusions, the ALJs feel more confident of their ability to decide
the controversy before them. As a result, we get greater decisional independence
and, so the theory tells us, better decisions.
In and of itself, Louisiana's move to a central panel ALJ system would be
noteworthy, because the central panel suggests a shift in the way we think about
administrative agencies. It affects agency structure and culture, and we would
expect to see modest changes in agency behavior, changes that invoke known
risks because the central panel has been implemented in so many other states.
The Legislature, however, made additional changes in the LAPA which went
well beyond the central panel. The APA now provides that, with certain
exceptions, "[i]n an adjudication commenced by the [Division of Administrative
Law] the administrative law judge shall issue the final decision or order,. . . and
the agency shall have no authority to override such decision or order."7 This is
a substantial shift' because the agency no longer controls the result. But not
only are ALJ decisions not subject to agency review and reversal, they apparently
are not even subject to agency appeal. The APA further provides that "[a]
person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication
5. And well rehearsed. See generally Symposium: Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. New
Eng. L. Rev. 587 (1984). Supporters include: Malcom C. Rich & Wayne E. Brucar, The Central
Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: A Survey of Seven States (1983); Heifetz, supra note
3, at 20-27; L. Harold Levinson, The Central Panel System: A Framework That Separates ALJs from
Administrative Agencies, 65 Judicature 236 (1981); Joseph J. Simeone, The Function, Flexibility, and
Future of United States Judges of the Executive Department, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 159 (1992); Karen
Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model Administra-
tive Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 537 (1985).
Opposition to the central panel system (at least for federal agencies) includes Paul R. Verkuil,
Daniel J. Gifford, Charles H. Koch, Jr., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., & Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Report for
Recommendations 92-7, The Federal Administrative Judiciary. in 2 Admin. Conf. of the United.
States, Recommendations and Reports (1992); Norman Zankel, A Unified Corps of Federal
Administrative Law Judges is Not Needed, 6 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 723 (1984). The Administrative
Conference of the United States recommended that Congress not move to a unified corps "at this
time." ACUS Recommendation 92-7, in I Admin. Conf. of the United States (1992), at 28, 42.
6. The Department of Health and Human Services imposed such controversial measures on
AUs within the Social Security Administration in the 1970s. The courts rejected the challenges to
these programs. Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 813, 110 S. Ct. 59
(1989); Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984).
7. La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (Supp. 1998).
8. 1 am resisting the urge to use the phrase "paradigm shift," although it usefully describes
what is happening in Louisiana administrative law and practice. See Cato Tonic, The Last Refuge
of Scoundrels: Selective Literalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 67, 69 n. 12
(1998) (criticizing overuse of the word "paradigm").
[Vol. 59
JAY S. BYBEE
proceeding is entitled to judicial review."9 An agency, however, is not "a
person" for purposes of the APA.' ° Accordingly, agencies are not entitled to
judicial review of adverse ALJ decisions."
This extreme decisional independence in Louisiana's ALJs is a severe
departure from the historical reasons-sometimes in tension-for which we have
created different structures in our administrative agencies: 2 First, agencies
should have a measure of independence because they are experts in the field and,
second, where their expertise is not apparent, the agencies should be politically
accountable for their decisions. Louisiana's recent reforms contradict the
perceived wisdom, the raison d'etre for administrative agencies. The LAPA
places ALJs in a central pool from which the Division of Administrative Law
may rotate them from one agency to another and it makes their decisions the
decisions of the agencies, unreviewable by the courts when the ALJs rule against
the agencies. The LAPA suggests that ALJs need have no particular expertise,
so they may conduct adjudications for any agency, and, moreover, that ALJ
decisions should be politically unaccountable. At the very least, the changes
portend a legislative vote of no confidence for Louisiana's agencies, which,
apparently, no longer can be trusted with the administration of the law.
This new role for Louisiana's ALJs may not fit our traditional models for
administrative agencies, but it does fit a model with which we are quite familiar;
they look very much like state districtjudges. In effect, though without formally
declaring this to be its intent, the Legislature has created an administrative court
of extraordinary authority. We are left to puzzle whether the Legislature has
consciously refashioned or inadvertently subverted Louisiana's administrative
process.
In this article, I propose to discuss each of these changes as a way of trying
to understand how the Legislature is remaking Louisiana's administrative
adjudications. These changes alter substantially-at least in theory-the power
of Louisiana's administrative agencies. If the Legislature has changed the
foundation from which its executive agencies proceed, then it may alter the way
the agencies behave in fact, although it is perhaps too early to understand the full
impact of these changes. Whatever the Legislature had in mind, the changes are
structural, and changes in administrative function will inevitably follow.
9. La. R.S. 49:964(A) (Supp. 1998).
10. La. R.S. 49:951(5) (Supp. 1998).
11. Lest we think that agency's inability to appeal adverse AU decisions was legislative
oversight, the Legislature in 1997 amended the definition of "person" to provide that "an agency is
a 'person' for the purpose of appealing an administrative ruling," but only in certain limited
disciplinary proceedings. 1997 La. Acts No. 1224, § I (codified at La. R.S. 49:951(5) (Supp. 1998)).
Under the usual administrative scheme, the fact that agencies cannot appeal adverse rulings was
of no consequence since the agency itself generally controlled the outcome and could reverse an AU.
12. Louisiana has a bewildering array of agencies. Although the Louisiana Constitution
specifies that there cannot be more than twenty departments in the executive branch, La. Const. art.
IV, § I(B); art. XIV, § 6, agencies located within those departments are legion. See 1979 Louisiana
State Agencies Handbook (1979 & Supp. 1980).
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In Part II, I trace briefly the history of administrative law judges in
American administrative procedure so that we will understand where we have
come from, why state and federal governments developed the system they did.
In Part III, I review each of the recent changes in Louisiana procedure bearing
on ALJ independence, discussing how the change departs from prior practice.
Finally, in Part IV, I consider how these changes together work to change
Louisiana administrative law. I conclude that administrative agencies will likely
turn from making policy through adjudication to relying on rulemaking; we thus
can expect to see an increase in administrative rules. I suspect that agencies may
become far more cautious in their enforcement efforts; the changes will surely
deter agencies from bringing some enforcement actions and may tempt Louisiana
agencies to underenforce their provisions. The finality of ALJ decisions raises
important questions as to the relative deference to be given agencies by the
courts. I also question whether the scheme violates separation of powers
provisions in the Louisiana Constitution. Finally, I ask what Louisiana's new
unified, independent corps of ALJ's can contribute to the state's administrative
process that could not be achieved by forcing all agency adjudications into state
courts in the first place.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AGENCY STRUCTURE AND USE OF ALJ'S
A history of administrative agencies, state or federal, is well beyond the
scope of this article. A briefhistory will help us understand something about the
purposes for administrative agencies and why we have structured them so
differently. I am going to begin with federal agencies because so much of state
administrative law followed the lead of the federal government.
A. Models for Administrative Agencies
1. The First Century: Agency Accountability
The United States Constitution creates three departments of govern-
ment-Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court-and it vests distinct
powers and responsibilities in each department. Article I of the Constitution
vests enumerated legislative power in a Congress, consisting of a House of
Representatives and a Senate. 3 Congress is a collegial body, and collegial
bodies represent double-edged swords. On the one hand, no single member of
Congress, neither the Speaker of the House nor the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate' 4 may speak on behalf of their respective chambers, much less on behalf
of Congress itself. Only the members of Congress, in Congress assembled, may
speak for Congress as the legislative branch of government. This gives Congress
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1.
14. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 5.
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a broad, representative base. On the other hand, just as no member of Congress
may speak for the whole, no single member of Congress may be held account-
able for the actions of Congress. Members of Congress are elected to office
from their respective districts or states and stand for periodic election in order
to retain those offices. They are accountable to their electorate, but no electorate
of the whole elects or rejects the entire Congress. When we are unhappy with
Congress we have no mechanism for wiping the slate clean, for "throwing the
bums out"; we can only throw our own bum out and hope that everyone else will
do the same. Having to stand for election makes our representatives and senators
accountable to us, but we have no single mechanism for holding the collective
body, Congress, accountable.
Article III creates "one supreme Court, and.., such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."'" The Supreme Court,
like Congress, is a collegial body. 6 We may disparage the presence and
influence of a'particular justice, but unless he or she can persuade four other
members of the Court to join him or her, the Court, as a constitutional
department exercising the judicial power of the United States, has not acted.
Federal judges are appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Because of the appointment power, the President has
some control over the judiciary. He has, however, no control over any individual
judge, even one he appointed. Once appointed, Article III judges enjoy life
tenure "during good Behavior" and receive compensation which Congress cannot
diminish during their tenure in office. 17 As members of a collegial body and
as federal officers not subject to election, recall, or dismissal, federal judges are
even less accountable to us than members of Congress.
Article II of the Constitution vests in a President the executive power of the
United States and the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."'" The President is the only one of the three departments of
government that is also a person. The President does not belong to a collegial
body; he alone exercises the executive power. The Constitution makes the
President the only principal officer of the government who must stand for
general election.' 9 The Constitution provides for the removal from office of
members of Congress, justices of the Supreme Court, and the President,2" but
only in the case of the President does removal of a single individual vacate an
entire constitutional department of the federal government. This structure makes
15. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
16. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992).
17. U.S. Const. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2; art. Ill, § 1.
18. U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
19. Of course, because of the electoral college, the President stands for general election only
in a limited sense. See U.S. Const. amend. XII; Martin Diamond, The Electoral College and the
American Idea of Democracy (1977).
20. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; art. II, § 4.
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the President accountable; he bears direct and full responsibility for the actions
of the executive branch.
The Founders considered and rejected a proposal for a Council of Revision
that would have divided the power of the executive among more than one
person." Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 70 that unity in the
executive was "conducive to energy" and that
[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree, than the
proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is
increased, these qualities will be diminished.22
Instead of creating a Council of Revision or a non-binding advisory coun-
cil-which James Wilson thought "oftener serves to cover, than prevent
malpractices"23-the Framers located the executive power in a single figure.
As Hamilton pointed out, "plurality in the executive ... tends to conceal faults,
and destroy responsibility. ' 24 His description of the consequences of dividing
authority in the executive branch sounds like modem complaints about Congress:
It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on
whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or series
of pernicious measures ought really to fall. It is shifted from one to
another with so much dexterity, and under such plausible appearances,
that the public opinion is left in suspense about the real author.2
The Constitution vests the President with the power to act decisively, but the
burden of being uniquely responsible for his actions.
Congress, beginning with the very First Congress, recognized that the
President could not faithfully execute the law unaided, and it created additional
executive offices, bureaus and departments to assist the President in his duties.
During the first century of our history, the President remained politically
responsible for these agencies. Congress based its model of subordinate agencies
on the model of the President as Chief Administrator. Congress created single-
headed agencies such as the various offices now in the cabinet (War, State,
Treasury, Commerce) and other, non-cabinet agencies (the Post Office, Office
of Customs, and Office of Patents and Copyrights).26 These agencies each had
a single titular head who alone was responsible for the actions of the agency and,
in turn, remained fully accountable to the President. Thus, the first hundred
21. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
22. The Federalist No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
23. 1 Farrand, supra note 21, at 97.
24. The Federalist No. 70, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
25. Id.
26. See Final Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 8-9
(1941) (hereinafter "Final Report").
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years of our history are marked by reliance on single-headed agencies. It was
the model of administrative decisionmaking we knew best: the President, the
governor, the mayor. We wanted our chief administrators where we could find
them."7
2. The Reform Period: Agency Independence
The arrival of the Industrial Revolution changed many things, not the least
of which was our conception of what government could plausibly do.2"
Transportation and communication brought the coasts closer; it facilitated
interstate trade, and it cast a spotlight on industry rather than agriculture.
Farmers, in particular, saw their influence erode and felt at the mercy of
more modem transportation. Transportation-principally the railroads-gave
farmers access to markets they could not reach before. But the railroads
exacted a heavy price in the form of monopoly profits. Farmers unwilling
to pay the railroads' rates lost their markets to their neighbors who
were.
29
The earliest efforts to regulate railroad service belonged to the states.30
These early commissions often served ad hoc and mainly as fact-finding advisors
for state legislatures." When, in 1886, the Supreme Court held that the states
could not regulate interstate railroad traffic within their borders,32 Congress
stepped in and created the Interstate Commerce Commission. The ICC was the
first regulatory commission designed to address national concerns; it was also the
first important multi-member commission. During the debates over creation of
the ICC, Senator Morgan of Alabama queried where the ICC fit in our
governmental structure:
27. Louisiana's constitutional structure, like that of many other states, follows the general
principles of this model. See La. Const. art. II, § I ("The powers of government of the state are
divided into three separate branches: legislative, executive, and judicial."). One difference between
Louisiana's executive branch and that of the federal government is that Louisiana has located other
constitutional officers in the executive branch besides the governor. The Attorney General, Secretary
of State, and Agriculture Commissioner, for example, are elected officers who enjoy independent
constitutional status. La. Const. art. IV, § 7 (secretary of state); § 8 (attorney general); § 10
(commissioner of agriculture).
This structure means that Louisiana's executive branch is not unitary-the governor does not
control the executive branch to the same degree as the President. Thus, Louisiana's attorney
general-unlike his federal counterpart-is accountable to the people directly, and not through the
governor. This structure does not affect my point that collegial bodies give us expertise or political
consensus, while single-headed agencies gives us political accountability.
28. See generally James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 7-15 (1938).
29. Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189,
1197-1208 (1986).
30. See Robert E. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 20-27 (1941).
31. Id. at 23. Professor Cushman notes that these fact-finding commissions were typically
composed of more than one official. Id.
32. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S. Ct. 4 (1886).
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Perhaps [the commissioners] ... are autocrats. But we ought to know
what they are .... It is the first bill I have ever known to be brought
into the Senate ... where the authors of it were not willing to enter
into a definition as to whether the powers they conferred ... were...
upon officers of the executive . . ., legislative . ., or judicial depart-
ment[s] ... .
The ICC was as much a product of the industrial and scientific revolution as the
problems it was created to address. The new multi-member agency was built on
a new administrative model: Though it seemed to exercise executive power, the
Commission, like Congress, was made collegial in order to offer its scientific
expertise; like the judiciary, the Commission was made largely free of political
pressure or reprisal.34 What the ICC offered us was informed, dispassionate
decisionmaking. No longer did commissioners serve at the pleasure of the
President. The independent regulatory commissions offered expertise, not
political accountability.
The ICC proved so popular that it was followed by other multi-headed
boards and commissions such as the Federal Reserve Board (1913), the Federal
Trade Commission (1914), the Tariff Commission (1916), the Water Power
Commission (1920), the Commodities Exchange Authority (1922), the Federal
Radio Commission (1927), the Federal Power Commission (1930), the Food &
Drug Administration (1931), and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1932).
With President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal in 1932 came a whole rash of
independent commissions, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(1933), the Farm Credit Administration (1933), the Federal Communications
Commission (1934), the Securities and Exchange Commission (1934), the
National Labor Relations Board (1935), the Bituminous Coal Commission
(1935), the Federal Maritime Administration (1936), and the Civil Aeronautics
Board (1938)." The Court proved very supportive of the efforts of the political
branches and responded with great deference to these agencies' decisions.36 It
33. Cushman, supra note 30, at 57 (quoting 17 Cong. Rec. 4422 (1887)).
34. See Landis, supra note 28, at 16-17. With the independent regulatory agencies what we
wanted was expertise and scientific management. In contrast to our earlier theories of government,
we were not as concerned with their political accountability. Not only did Congress create collegial
commissions, it often provided that the President could not remove commissioners except for cause,
and Congress gave the commissioners fixed tenure and a term that ensured that the commissioners
would serve beyond the immediate term of the President who appointed them. See Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935).
35. See Final Report, supra note 26, at 9-1i; Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law 8-9
(1998).
36. See, e.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488,71 S. Ct.. 456, 465 (1951)
("even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may [not] displace the Board's choice between
two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice
had the matter been before it de novo."); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 164
(1944) ("interpretations ... of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
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was a romantic era for government generally, and in our minds we idealized the
role of the independent agencies.
3. The New Reform: Back to Accountability
The 1960s saw a more cynical view of independent agencies. One
significant theory suggested that when agencies became the guardians of their
powerful wards, instead of a disciplining force, the agencies were "captured."
37
Thus, what we needed was not agency independence, but political accountabili-
ty.38 During this era, Congress returned to the model of single-headed agencies.
Better that agencies answer to the President than that they be formally
independent of the President and (informally) answerable to industry.
Congress created a number of single-headed agencies within existing
executive departments: the Federal Highway Administration (1966), the Federal
Railroad Administration (1966), the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (1970), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(1970), and the Mine Enforcement and Safety Administration (1973). Congress
also created several free-standing agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency
(1970), the National Credit Union Administration (1970), and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (1972). Unlike the independent
commissions created during the New Deal, the new free-standing agencies were
largely single-headed agencies accountable to the President.39
4. Modern Trend: Independent Accountability?
The modem trend looks to the best of both of these models and may yet
discover the worst. Congress has created relatively few new agencies in the past
years. Two represent the strangest animals yet: independent single-headed
agencies-agencies that vest extraordinary power to a single, unaccountable
individual. The first of these is the revamped Social Security Administration.
In 1994, Congress freed the Social Security Administration from the Department
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. I 11,
130, 64 S. Ct. 851, 860 (1944) (the "task [of defining statutory terms] has been assigned primarily
to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act."), overruled in part on other grounds,
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, -503 U.S. 318, 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992); Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194, 61 S. Ct. 845, 852 (1941) ("courts must not enter the allowable area of
... [agency] discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow
confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy.").
37. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1039 (1997).
38. Rabin, supra note 29, at 1193.
39. During this period Congress also established additional independent agencies, including the
Consumer Products Safety Commission (1972), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1974), and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1977).
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of Health and Human Services.4" A single commissioner will continue to head
the Social Security Administration and will serve for a six year term. The
Commissioner appears to be accountable to Congress alone. No longer does the
President have the power to direct the actions of the Commissioner or remove
her except for "neglect of duty or malfeasance in office,"'" and her budget
requests go straight to Congress, bypassing ordinary budget review at OMB.42
The second example has become, unfortunately, quite familiar to us: the
Office of the Independent Counsel.43 The Independent Counsel operates only
loosely under the guidelines of the Department of Justice and serves until the
matter has been fully investigated and prosecuted to his satisfaction. Short of the
Independent Counsel's gross misconduct in office, no one except Congress can
remove the Independent Counsel.44
A final hybrid we should note is the unusual jurisdictional overlap between
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which is a single-
headed agency within the Department of Labor, and the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission (OSHRC), a multi-headed, independent commis-
sion."' OSHA bears responsibility for promulgating regulations and bringing
enforcement actions, but adjudications are held before OSHRC. An employer
who contests OSHA's citation may appear before an ALJ employed by OSHRC.
OSHRC reviews, in its discretion, the initial decisions of its ALJs.46 The lower
courts initially divided over which of the question, in the event of a difference
of opinion between OSHA and OSHRC, to which agency (if either) should the
courts defer?47 In 1991, the Supreme Court held that courts should defer to
40. Pub. L. No. 103-296, title 1, 108 Stat. 1465 (1994) (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 901-13 (1994
& Supp. 11 1996)).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 902(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 904(b) (1994).
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1996) ("An independent counsel... may be removed
from office, other than by impeachment and conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney
General and only for good cause, or physical or mental disability .... ). See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 108 S. CL 2597 (1988).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1994). See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting
OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 57-62 (1989); George
R. Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model, Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA
Experiences, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315 (1987). Congress created a similar model in the Mine
Enforcement and Safety Administration and the Mine Enforcement and Safety Review Commission.
30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
46. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 659, 661j) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
47. See Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative
Agency Structure, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 965, 1001-02 & nn.109-11 (1991) (some circuits gave
deference to OSHRC, some to OSHA, and one gave deference to neither; citing cases); Benjamin W.
Mintz, Administrative Separation of Functions: OSHA and the NLRB, 47 Cath. U. L. Rev. 877, 888-
93 (1998). See also W. Christian Schumann, The Allocation of Authority Under the Mine Act: Is
the Authority to Decide Questions of Policy Vested in the Secretary of Labor or in the Review
Commission?, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 1063 (1996).
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OSHA, not OSHRC.4 s "[W]hen a traditional, unitary agency uses adjudication
to engage in lawmaking by regulatory interpretation, it necessarily interprets
regulations that it has promulgated." By contrast, the Commission exercised
"nonpolicymaking adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the
agency-review context.
49
Finally, we have what appear to be multi-headed executive agencies. The
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission made recommendations to
the President on military base closures. The President either approved for
closure the entire list or he disapproved the entire list and the Commission
started over." The Commission gives the controversial base closure decisions
an air of detached expertise, while the President becomes politically accountable
for the ultimate decision.
B. Administrative Law Judges: Some Parallel History
1. The Origins of ALJ's
The early history of ALJs lacks the same sense of drama as the creation of
the independent agencies, but the history is surprisingly similar, although slightly
out of sync. In the early days of federal agencies, the agency principals acted
as finders of fact; the commissioners themselves heard the facts in disputed cases
and decided the law." "[T]he reason for agency-head review of hearing-officer
decisions was not primarily to correct 'factual' mistakes of the hearing officers,
but to maintain control over policy development and application.""2 Informally,
commissioners relied on agency employees to assist them in making factual and
legal determinations. These employees served much the same finction as a
judicial law clerk, advising the principal who makes the ultimate decision. The
formal precursors of our modem ALJs were hearing examiners, created by
48. Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 1I1 S. Ct. 1171 (1991). The D.C. Circuit has held that
OSHRC is similar to a district court and cannot appear as a party to defend its own decisions. Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. OSHRC, 671 F.2d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
49. 499 U.S. at 154, 111 S. Ct. at 1178.
50. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808
(reprinted at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (1994)). See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 114 S. Ct. 1719
(1994).
51. The Attorney General's Final Report noted the variety of means in which agencies
employed their hearing examiners:
... In most of the agencies the person who presides is an adviser with no real power to
decide. In a few agencies the hearing officer's or board's decision is conclusive unless
appealed by the parties to the head of the agency or unless the agency head itself takes
the case up for consideration after initial decision. In one instance initial decision by the
hearing officer is final without provision for administrative appeal. In another case there
is no appeal to the agency as of right, and the decision of the hearing officer is final
unless discretion is exercised to grant a request for review.
Final Report, supra note 26, at 44. See also Simeone, supra note 5.
52. Gifford, supra note 47, at 980.
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Congress in 1906 in the ICC in order to "subdelegat[e]... fact-finding duties
and [offer] greater functional specialization....
The real expansion of ALJs arrived with the New Deal as new agencies were
created and their powers fearfully increased. Given the agencies' broad mandate,
hearing examiners became essential, so Congress routinely authorized agencies
to employ hearing examiners. In some cases Congress dictated the powers of
hearing examiners, while in other cases the agencies themselves prescribed the
examiners' role. These duties extended from merely advising the agency to
conducting full blown trials.54
The organized bar saw this expansion in the role of hearing examiners as an
attack on the role of neutral decisionmakers in settling disputes. In the 1930s the
American Bar Association sought to make the procedures used by agencies more
like court procedures; to separate the adjudicative functions within agencies from
the agencies' other responsibilities; and to increase the professional qualifications
of hearing examiners to make them independent of agency influence. At one
point the ABA evidently endorsed the idea of a United States administrative
court." The administrative court would have worked the complete separation
of hearing examiners from agencies and would have placed real power-the
power to make findings and initial recommendations-outside of executive
branch agencies. In 1937 President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative
Management issued its report and proposed something of a compromise. It
recommended that personnel within an agency be separated according to their
adjudicative or investigative functions. 5"
2. Statutory Control of ALJs
In 1941, the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
issued its highly influential report. The Attorney General's Final Report took
a strong position on ALJs remaining within the agency's structure: "Efficient
conduct of the work demands that hearing officers specialize in the work of
specific agencies .... Specialization is one of the fundamentals of the
administrative process." The Final Report also made clear what the structural
role of the ALJ was-"the hearing commissioner is in a very real sense acting
for the head of the agency."" The Final Report recognized that ALJs should
53. Gerald M. Pops, The Judicialization of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Implications
for Policymaking, 81 W. Va. L. Rev. 169, 170 (1979).
54. Lloyd D. Musolf, Federal Examiners and the Conflict of Law and Administration 47-56
(1953); Verkuil et al., supra note 5, at 799-800; Pops, supra note 53, at 170-71.
55. Musolf, supra note 54, at 37-42; Pops, supra note 53, at 170-71. See also Robert M.
Cooper, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 193,565 (2 pts.) (1936
& 1937).
56. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131, 73 S. Ct. 570, 572
(1953); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-45, 70 S. Ct. 445, 448-51 (1950); Musolf,
supra note 54, at 39.
57. Final Report, supra note 26, at 47.
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exercise "[i]ndependence of judgment"-in the sense that ALJs should be
impartial-but it also recommended that ALJs remain in the control of the
agencies whose head they represented."8
The Committee's recommendations became the basis for the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, which Congress enacted in 1946."9 The APA
represented a compromise between those, like the Attorney General, who viewed
the role of the hearing examiner as an integrated part of the process of executive
branch enforcement, and those, such as the ABA, who thought hearing examiners
should follow a more formal judicial model. The compromise was nowhere more
evident than in one of the congressional reports accompanying the bill that became
the APA. The report stated that Congress intended to make hearing examiners "a
special class of semi-independent subordinate hearing officers." 6 There was real
irony in the juxtaposition of the words "independent" and "subordinate."
The present federal APA provides that hearings at which the agency receives
evidence may be presided over by the agency itself, one or more members of the
body comprising the agency, or an administrative law judge.6' Although
agencies have the primary responsibility for their ALJs, the Office of Personnel
Management has some role in the hiring and retention of ALJs. 62 The federal
APA contains several provisions that contribute to the decisional independence
of hearing officers. Each agency is authorized to appoint "as many administra-
tive law judges as are necessary" to conduct the adjudicatory proceedings of the
agency.63 Agencies must assign cases to ALJs "in rotation."' ' Although ALJs
do not enjoy life tenure as Article III judges, they have nearly the same job
security and may be dismissed "only for good cause established. ' 6' An agency
must keep separate its prosecutorial and adjudicatory personnel. ALJs may not
be responsible to, or subject to supervision by, anyone performing investigative
or prosecutorial functions for the agency,' nor may they "perform duties
inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities as administrative law judg-
es." 67 So strict is this "separation of functions" requirement that certain agency
58. Final Report, supra note 26, at 47.
59. The federal APA is codified, as amended, at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3344,
5362, 7521 (1994 & Supp. 111996).
60. See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 132 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History,
S. Doc. 79-248, at 192 (1945)).
61. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1994). Employees presiding at agency hearings may administer oaths,
issue subpoenas, rule on offers of proof, take depositions, hold settlement conferences, and make
recommended or initial decisions. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1994).
62. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372 (1994). See also Jeffrey Lubbers, Federal
Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 Admin. L. Rev. 109, 112-20
(1981).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 7521(a).
66. Id. § 554(dX2).
67. Id. § 3105.
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employees may not communicate with ALJs outside the record; that is, some
intra-agency communications are ex parte communications just as if received
from non-agency interested parties.6" Although there has been a great deal of
discussion over whether to create a unified ALI corps in the federal system,69
federal ALJs remain under the immediate control of their hiring agency. °
C. State APAs and ALJs
In 1961 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
issued the Model State Administrative Procedure Act ("1961 MSAPA"), which
followed and improved upon the federal APA.7 More than half of the
states-including Louisiana-based their state APA's on the 1961 Model State
Act.7 2 The National Conference of Commissioners issued a second Model State
APA in 1981 ("1981 MSAPA"), 3 but Louisiana has not adopted it. As
Professor Dakin observed just prior to Louisiana adopting portions of the 1961
MSAPA, "Louisiana comes relatively late to the enterprise of preparing a general
agency procedure act but consequently has the benefit of much legislative
experience elsewhere."
74
The 1961 MSAPA did not make any recommendations with respect to ALJs.
This was apparently because of the "bewildering heterogeneity of the functions
and responsibilities of hearing officers in state agencies. 'M The 1961 MSAPA
recognized the role ALJs in fact played, but only as a matter of reflected light. 6
Instead of proposing a model for state ALJs, or even a couple of models, the
68. Id. § 554(d)(1).
69. E.g., Reorganization of the Federal Administrative Judiciary Act: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1995); Reorganization of the Federal Administrative Judiciary Act: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Pt. 2), 104th Cong. (1996);
Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992). See also Victor
W. Palmer & Edwin S. Bernstein, Establishing Federal Administrative Law Judges as an Independent
Corps: The Heflin Bill, 6 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 673 (1984).
70. Agencies that are "occasionally or temporarily ... insufficiently staffed with administrative
law judges" may borrow ALJs with consent of other agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (1994).
71. See I Frank E. Cooper, State Administrative Law, at 7-13 (1965); Arthur E. Bonfield, The
Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 Va. L. Rev. 297, 301 (1986). The first MSAPA was
issued in 1946 and was adopted by twelve states. Id. at 299 & n.14.
72. Michael Asimow et al., State and Federal Administrative Law 5 (2d ed. 1998); Melvin G.
Dakin, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Critique and Commentary, 25 La.
L. Rev. 799 (1965).
73. 14 U.L.A. 357 (1980).
74. Dakin, supra, note 72, at 800. See also Robert Force & Lawrence Griffith, The Louisiana
Administrative Procedure Act, 42 La. L. Rev. 1227 (1982); Karen M. Karr, Note, Louisiana's
"New" Administrative Procedure Act, 35 La. L. Rev. 629 (1975).
75. Cooper, supra note 71, at 331.
76. See, e.g., 1961 MSAPA § 13 (referring to "members or employees of an agency assigned
to render a decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case").
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1961 MSAPA simply left state ALJs where it found them. Because of this
omission from the 1961 MSAPA, it is not surprising that when Louisiana
adopted its APA in 1967 it included no reference to hearing officers. Like the
1961 MSAPA, the Louisiana Legislature simply left the responsibilities of ALJs
to agency innovation or ad hoc legislative action.
By contrast, the 1981 MSAPA formally recognized the widespread use of
state ALJs and wrote them into the model act." Generally, the MSAPA
prescribed a role for ALJs sympathetic with their historical federal roles-an
initial decisionmaker, whose judgment is subject to revision by the agency
head."8  The 1981 MSAPA also took note of an important innovation in the
states, the development of the central panel.7 9 Pioneered in California in the
1940s and adopted, in some form, by some twenty states,80 the central panel
system provides for a central office that hires and assigns state administrative law
judges. The theory is a simple one: A central panel gives ALJs greater
decisional independence because the ALJs do not depend on agency heads for
their employment. Decisional independence is not the same as an independent
decision. It is a matter of degree. Even in central panel systems, an ALJ's
decision will be subject to agency review and reversal, even if the ALJ's
employment will not."
III. LOUISIANA'S REFORMS: CENTRAL PANEL OR ADMINISTRATIVE COURT?
From the principles and brief history discussed in the previous section, three
models for administrative law judges emerge: (1) ALJs as judicial law clerks,
(2) ALJs as initial factfimders subject to appeal within the agency, and (3) ALJs
as an administrative court entitled to deference for its own expertise. After
discussing these models, I then turn to Louisiana's recent legislation and attempt
to classify its latest reforms.
77. See, e.g., 1981 MSAPA § 4-202(a).
78. See, e.g., 1981 MSAPA § 4-215(a), (b); § 4-216(a).
79. 1981 MSAPA § 4-301.
80. As of 1989, Professors Bonfield and Asimow listed only ten states with a central panel of
AUs: California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina,
Tennessee and Washington. Arthur Earl Bonfield & Michael Asimow, State and Federal
Administrative Law 176 (1989). By 1994, Colorado's Chief Administrative Law Judge added
Hawaii, Maryland, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. Honorable Edwin L. Felter,
Jr., The Hidden Executive Branch Judiciary: Colorado's Central Panel Experience-Lessons For
the Feds, 14 J. Nat'l Ass'n of Admin. L. Judges 95, 96 & n.4 (1994). North Dakota's Director of
Administrative Hearings would include Missouri, Virginia, and Wyoming. Allen Hoberg,
Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 75, 77 (1994). At
least South Carolina should be added to this list. William B. Swent, South Carolina's ALI: Central
Panel, Administrative Court, or a Little of Both?, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Benjamin Turner
Zeigler, The South Carolina Administrative Law Judge Division and the Limits of Central Panel
Decision-Making Power (1997) (unpublished manuscript; copy in author's possession).
81. 1981 MSAPA § 4-216(a).
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A. AiJ Roles
1. Judicial Law Clerk Model
We can describe the traditional role for ALJs as the Law Clerk Model. Law
Clerks for federal and state judges serve an increasingly influential function in
the judicial system. Although I say "increasingly influential," the function
remains informal rather than formal. Neither federal law nor state law (that I am
aware of) vests governmental authority in judicial law clerks.8 2 They advise;
they do not decide. 3 Typically, a law clerk will orally advise a judge on
particular cases or issues and may draft opinions. Often, judges will ask a law
clerk to draft an opinion for the judge's review. The judge may accept the draft
without revision, accept part of it, ignore it, or even disagree with it entirely.
Whatever the judge decides in chambers with respect to the clerk's draft opinion,
the draft opinion is only a draft. It is not publicly released, it is not subject to
response by counsel for the parties, it may not be used to impeach the judge's
own opinion. 4 Only when the judge issues the opinion as his own does the
opinion become law of the case-and whether the law clerk wrote some of the
opinion or every word of it, the judge accepts full responsibility for the opinion.
The origins of ALJs fit well within this model. As I discussed in the prior
section, the agencies turned to hearing examiners because the agency principals
could not personally conduct all of the agency's hearings. The examiners
conducted the hearings in the place of the agency administrator or commission-
ers, but the ultimate decision reposed in the agency principals.8" By using
hearing examiners, the agency did not commit any formal authority to the
examiners-the examiners could not issue final decisions, only initial decisions
subject to approval or revision by the agency. A good example is found in the
82. United States district court judges are authorized to appoint law clerks, 28 U.S.C. § 752
(1994), but a "law clerk has no statutorily defined duties." Fredonia Broad. Corp., Inc. v. RCA
Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 255 (5th Cir. 1978).
83. See United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379-80, 60 S. Ct. 944, 946-47
(1940) (recommendations of the Tariff Commission were not reviewable until acted upon by the
President or Congress); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51-52, 52 S. Ct. 285, 291-92 (1932)
(advisory nature of certain findings by masters does not interfere with the Article III responsibilities
of the courts). See also Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 104 Yale L.J. 51, 101-03 (1994) (describing the difference, for purposes
of separation of powers, between merely advising and requiring advice to be accepted).
84. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 968 (5th Cir. 1980) ("a law
clerk's views cannot be attributed to the judge for whom the clerk works").
85. See, e.g., La. R.S. 47:1992(F)(3) (Supp. 1998) (Orleans Parish [Board of Assessment
Review] "may create one or more hearing officers, any one of whom shall be a member of the board
of review and who may conduct all required public hearings of the board with or without the
presence of the other members, provided that no final action may be taken by such board of review
unless a quorum is present."); La R.S. 3:4107(A) (1987) (Dairy Stabilization Board may designate
a hearing officer to conduct the hearing and "present the entire record of the proceeding to the board
for disposition.").
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procedures governing the Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control: "whenever a
hearing [within the Office of Alcoholic Beverage Control] is conducted by a
person designated by the commissioner to hold the hearing ... [the record] shall
be made and certified by the hearing examiner to the commissioner for his
consideration and decision.""6
Depending on the agency, and the level of confidence an agency has in any
particular ALJ, an agency may in fact give great credence and deference to an
ALJs findings and conclusions, but there is no legal reason that they must-just
as a judge may in fact rely (or not) on a law clerk's draft opinion. 7 This
principal has long been a fixture of American administrative law. In Universal
Camera Corporation v. NLRB, the United States Supreme Court sustained the
NLRB's reversal of its hearing examiner even though the examiner had taken
live testimony from witnesses.8" The Court rejected the argument that the
relationship between ALJ and agency was analogous to that of a special master
and district court. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a district court
"shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous."8 9 By
contrast, the Court said, "[t]he responsibility for decision thus placed on the
Board is wholly inconsistent with the notion that it has power to reverse an
examiner's findings only when they are 'clearly erroneous."' 9°
The Law Clerk Model recognizes the primacy of the agency head and
subordinates the role of the ALL The Model is certainly consistent with a
86. La. R.S. 26:297 (1989). See La. R.S. 26:100 (1989) (Commissioner of Alcoholic Beverage
Control; same); La. R.S. 26:919 (Supp. 1998) (Commissioner of the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco
Control; same); La. R.S. 51:2232(6) (Supp. 1998) ("'Hearing examiner' means one or more person
or commissioners designated by the [Louisiana Commission on Human Rights] to conduct a hearing.
The commission shall have the sole power to determine qualifications of the examiner."). See also
La. R.S. 33:4755.5(B) (1988) (chairman [of the New Orleans Housing Commission] shall set a date
for hearing the matter within thirty days, shall notify the members of the commission, and shall
appoint a hearing officer from the staff of the commission or from the City's Department of Law.");
La. R.S. 49:214.36(L) (Supp. 1998) ("The secretary [of Department of Natural Resources] shall
appoint an independent hearings officer."); Southern Shell Fish Co. v. Office of Public Health, 703
So. 2d 1321, 1323 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1997).
An interesting variation is the Louisiana Advisory Commission on Pesticides. The Commissioner
convenes the commission and appoints a hearing officer to preside. The Commission makes the
initial determination, and the Commissioner makes the final decision. Only if the Commissioner's
conclusion differs from the Commission's must his opinion be in writing. La. RIS. 3:3214 (1987).
See La. R.S. 3:4605.A (Supp. 1998) (Commission of Weights and Measures; same).
87. One difference between an AU's opinion and a law clerk's opinion is that the AU's
opinion may be considered part of the record for purposes of judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)
(1994); La. R.S. 49:955(E)(6) (1990).
88. 340 U.S. 474, 492, 71 S. Ct. 456, 467 (1950).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
90. 340 U.S. at 492, 71 S. Ct. at 467. See also Matter of Cecos Int'l, Inc., 574 So. 2d 385,
388 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 576 So. 2d 18 (1991) (rejecting the argument that
Secretary of DEQ cannot overrule hearing officer unless the Secretary finds manifest error; decision
based on LAPA before recent amendments).
1999]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
central panel approach, as the experience of several states demonstrates, 9 but
it is not a particularly aggressive use of the central panel. It creates modest
institutional independence in ALJs, but not decisional independence. 92
2. The Appellate Review Model
In the Appellate Review Model, the ALJ serves a broader, more formal role.
The ALJ serves as the initial decisionmaker, and the decision bears a presump-
tion of finality until the agency, acting in more of an appellate role, modifies or
reverses the ALJ's decision. In some agencies, the AL's decision will become
final-technically, it becomes the decision of the agency-unless the agency
determines to review the decision. A good example is found in Title 30, which
governs the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality: "An order or
decision of a hearing officer [at DEQ] becomes final thirty days after the last
notice is given .... However, the secretary [of DEQ] may reserve the right to
make the final decision."93  In some agencies, an AL's findings of fact are
entitled to some standard of deference.94 The agency may reverse the ALJ, but
(unlike the law clerk model) it must explain itself publicly.95 Under this model,
the agency has the last say, but an agency decision that ignores the findings and
conclusions of an ALJ is more vulnerable on appeal.96
91. See Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act:
Adjudication Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1067, 1114 (1992); Levinson, supra note 5, at 242;
Kauper, supra note 5, at 560 n.122. See also In re Kallen, 455 A.2d 460 (N.J. 1983) (AU may not
refuse remand from agency head to receive more evidence); In re Certain Sections of the Uniform
Administrative Procedure Rules, 447 A.2d 151, 156 (1982) ("Administrative law judges have no
independent decisional authority. Any attempt to exercise such authority would constitute a serious
encroachment upon an agency's ability to discharge its regulatory responsibilities.").
92. See Zeigler, supra note 80, at 7-9. See also Capital Utils. Corp. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 708 So. 2d 368 (La. 1998) (affirming decision of PSC in which the Commission disagreed
with AU and remanded the decision to a different AU).
93. La. R.S. § 30:2050.16(B) (Supp. 1998). Professor Murchison has recently questioned the
validity of this section in light of the recent changes in the LAPA. Kenneth M. Murchison, Recent
Changes in Procedures of the Department of Environmental Quality, 57 La. L. Rev. 855,862, 872-76
(1997) [hereinafter, Murchison, Recent Changes]. See also La. R.S. 46:236.5(C) (Supp. 1998)
(authorizing appointment of hearing officers to hear paternity and support matters; if no exceptions
to hearing officer's recommendations, the matter becomes final and appealable to the court of
appeals); La. R.S. 47:1992(D) (1990) (determinations by assessment board of review are final unless
appealed to the tax commission); 1998 La. Acts No. 114, § 25 (decision by hearing officer is
suspended pending final decision by the Louisiana Gaming Control Board).
94. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.058(e) (Vernon Supp. 1998) ("A state agency may
change a finding of fact or conclusion of law made by the administrative law judge ... only if the
agency determines .... [listing requirements]"; this provision has been amended, but remains in
effect for adjudications begun prior to September 1, 1997; see id. note).
95. See Aylett v. HUD, 54 F.3d 1560, 1566-67 (10th Cir. 1995) (requiring HUD to explain its
reversal of AU on credibility questions). See also Asimow et al., supra note 72, at 547-48;
Levinson, supra note 5, at 242 (noting states in which the AU's decision is "presumptively correct").
96. See, e.g., Texas World Serv. Co. v. NLRB, 928 F.2d 1426, 1430 (5th Cir. 1991) ("when
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The degree to which a reviewing court will credit the disagreement between
the agency principals and the ALJ depends on whether the disagreement involves
matters of fact, law, or policy. An agency that disagrees with an ALJ in matters
of policy or construction of agency regulations or the agency's organic statute is
on much stronger ground than an agency that disagrees with an ALJ over matters
of fact, at least where the ALJ made credibility judgments and the agency has
not carefully explained itself.9" Florida provides a good example of this kind
of review. As to those conclusions of law and construction of regulations "over
which [the agency] has substantive jurisdiction," the agency may reject the ALJ's
conclusions in whole or in part.9 s However, "[t]he agency may not reject or
modify the findings of fact unless the agency first determines from a review of
the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of
fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence ..... 99 This kind of
scheme commits to the agency the right to establish policy and interpret its own
statutes and rules, but recognizes the ALJ as the first trier of fact. It does not
strip the agency of the power to reverse the ALJ even as to matters of fact, but
it requires the agency to explain itself.
In general, even under the Appellate Review Model, the courts will give
greater deference to the agency than to an ALJ, but the ALJs have greater
authority than under the Law Clerk Model. The Appellate Model sees the ALJ
as an integrated part of the agency's decisionmaking process and gives the ALJ
his or her due. The Appellate Review Model is quite conducive to the central
panel approach because the ALJ is already seen as an independent decisionmaker
within the process. Vesting the authority to hire and supervise ALJs outside the
agency does not compromise the agency's mission, since the agency must
formally address an AL's initial decision.
3. The Administrative Court Model
Finally, the model that gives the least deference to the agency and the
greatest to the ALJ is the Administrative Court Model. In this case, the ALJ
becomes an independent decisionmaker. The agency has no power to reverse the
ALJ; rather, the ALJ is in the same position vis-a-vis the agency that a United
... [the NLRB] disagrees with the AU's findings, this court examines the evidence and findings of
the Board more critically than it would have done had the Board agreed with the AU.").
97. See Wollerson v. Department of Agriculture, 436 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 441 So. 2d 1221 (1983) ("When [the Civil Service Commission's] hearings were
conducted before a hearing examiner, courts have applied a less restrictive standard of review and
have made an independent review of the record to determine whether the conclusion of the
Commissioner was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly wrong."). See also Allen v. State Bd. of
Dentistry, 543 So. 2d 908, 915 (La. 1989); Bosarge v. New Orleans Street Dept., 459 So. 2d 693,
698 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (Redmann, C.J., dissenting).
98. Fla. Stat. Ann. 120.57(1)(j) (West Supp. 1998). See also Asimow, supra note 91, at 1122-
24 (discussing the Florida statute).
99. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 120.57(1)0) (West Supp. 1998).
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States District Court would be to a United States Attorney. A United States
Attorney must bring enforcement actions before the district court and receives
no special treatment even though both the United States Attorney and the United
States District Judge are presidential appointees and employees of the United
States government. Maine and Missouri have adopted some form of administra-
tive law court,"° and OSHRC, MSHRC and, perhaps, the Court of Veterans'
Appeals'0 ' may be such courts within the federal system. This is a proposal
that has been around for some time,102 but has not found widespread accep-
tance.10
3
There are a couple of provisions among Louisiana's administrative agencies
that approach the independence of an administrative court. For example, the
Department of Fisheries and Wildlife has two options for assessing civil penalties
for persons unlawfully taking fish, wild birds, or wild mammals. The Depart-
ment may file a civil suit, or it may proceed by an "adjudicatory hearing."',
When the Department conducts such a hearing "[e]ither party may appeal from
a ruling of the administrative hearing officer to the district court."' ' Although
the statute does not say that the hearing officer's determination is unreviewable
by the agency, the fact that either party may take an appeal is strong evidence
that the agency may not review the hearing officer's decision, except as a party
in the district court. Because the hearing officer is an employee of the
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, the officer is not, strictly speaking, an
administrative court. The unreviewability of the hearing officer's decision,
however, gives the officer the independence of such a body.0
100. See Rich & Brucar, supra note 5, at 10.
101. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (1994) (the court has "exclusive jurisdiction" to review decisions of
the Board of Veterans' Appeal. "The Secretary may not seek review of any such decision.") See
also Gifford, supra note 47, at 1004-05 (discussing deference, if any, the Court of Veterans' Appeals
should give decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals).
102. See Cooper, supra note 55; Newton Minow, Suggestions for Improvement of the
Administrative Process: Letter to President Kennedy, 15 Admin. L. Rev. 146 (1963); Neil Sullivan,
Independent Adjudication and Occupational Safety and Health Policy: A Test for Administrative
Court Theory, 31 Admin. L. Rev. 177 (1979); George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split Enforcement
Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 Admin. L. Rev. 315 (1987);
Frederick Davis, Judicialization of Administrative Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing
Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 Duke L.J. 389.
103. But see Gifford, supra note 47, at 971-72 (describing other "alternative" processes involving
ALJs outside the agency structure).
104. La. RIS. 56:40.3(B) (Supp. 1998).
105. La. R.S. 56:40.3(D) (Supp. 1998).
106. See also La. R.S. 13:2575-76 (Supp. 1998) (municipalities and parishes may employ
hearing officer to conduct hearings and issue orders for public health, housing, fire code,
environmental and historic district violations; appeals are to the district court); La. R.S. 17:3621.3
(Supp. 1998) (state superintendent of elementary and secondary education shall appoint a hearing
officer for debt collection matters; all appeals go to the Nineteenth Judicial District for East Baton
Rouge Parish).
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The Administrative Court Model raises some interesting questions over
which body-the agency enforcing the provisions or the administrative court
issuing the final decision-is entitled to deference before a reviewing court.
Consider the Wildlife and Fisheries structure discussed above. If the hearing
officer and the agency disagree over either the facts or the interpretation of the
agency's regulations, who prevails? To whom does the district court defer? The
ultimate answer to this question may depend on the nature of the issue before the
reviewing court, whether the issue is one of fact, law or policy. This model
challenges the idea that we create administrative agencies to bring expertise to
the process; we have never demanded that judges of general jurisdiction have any
particular expertise.' °7 The Administrative Court Model presents us with a
hybrid, in which we value the agency for its expertise in promulgating
regulations and deciding when to bring enforcement actions, but we want
independent reassessment of the agency's judgment.
With the Administrative Court Model we may fairly ask why have an
administrative court at all? An administrative court may have expertise in
administrative procedure, and experience may bring its members some familiarity
with regulatory matters, but judges are not regulators. If ALJs have no more
expertise than regular state or federal court judges, then why have the administra-
tive court at all? And if we can obtain independent review of agency action in
federal or state court, what does the Administrative Court add except for an
additional level of review?'
B. Louisiana's Recent Changes to the APA
1. The Division of Administrative Law
As I mentioned in the prior section, the 1961 MSAPA contained no
provisions for ALJs. When Louisiana adopted much of the 1961 MSAPA in
1967, it followed suit. Until the recent amendments, the Louisiana APA
contained but a single reference to "administrative hearing officer," and the term
was found in a section addressed specifically to oil and gas development added
107. See Antonio Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-A Reprise, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 57, 61 (1979) ("our
system for selecting article III judges makes no pretense (or at least no convincing pretense) of being
based primarily upon merit or performance.").
108. See Verkuil et al., supra note 5, at 1042:
Congress originally assigned adjudication of some types of disputes to Article I agencies
rather than to Article III courts to further several goals: (i) to take advantage of
specialized expertise; (2) to provide a less formal and less expensive means of resolving
some types of disputes; (3) to attain a higher degree of interdecisional consistency in
adjudicating disputes that arise in administering national regulatory and benefit programs;
and (4) to allow agencies to control the policy components of administrative adjudications.
By adopting the [Unified] Corps proposal, each of those goals would be abandoned in
favor of an administrative adjudication system designed to replicate the Article III courts.
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to the APA in 1991.'09 The role of ALJs in the LAPA was implicit, not
explicit."' There are, of course, numerous references to "hearing officer" or
"hearing examiner" scattered throughout the Louisiana RevisedStatutes, but each
of these references relates to specific agencies.
In 1995, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Acts No. 739, creating a new
Division of Administrative Law within the Department of State Civil Ser-
vice."' The Director of the division, who must be appointed by the governor
and confirmed by the Senate, employs the ALJs for the Division." 2 The
Legislature specified that ALJs must be licensed to practice law in Louisiana and
have practiced for at least five years. 13  The Act grants ALJs new
powers to conduct prehearing conferences and specifies grounds for
disqualification and withdrawal of ALJs." 4 The Division will "handle all
adjudications in the manner required by the Administrative Procedure Act,"
and such adjudications "shall be resolved exclusively as required" by the
Act and the APA." 5  Significantly, the Act exempts from the Division's
jurisdiction the office of workers' compensation and the office of regulatory
services within the Department of Labor, the entire Department of
Agriculture, certain adjudications by the Assistant Secretary of the Office
of Conservation, the Public Service Commission, and all state professional
and occupational licensing boards." 6  Somewhat ambiguously, the Act
provides that "[a]ny board or commission authorized by law to conduct
hearings may continue to hold such hearings.""' 7 It is not clear what
this last provision refers to, but evidently the Legislature contemplated that
some boards and commissions may, but are not obligated to, request that
an ALJ conduct adjudication.
109. La. R.S. 49:954.2(G) (Supp. 1998).
110. The LAPA refers to an "agency or its subordinate presiding officer" in connection with
adjudication. La. R.S. 49:956(4) (Supp. 1998). See also La. R.S. 49:957 (Supp. 1998) (referring
to adjudication in which "a majority of the officials of the agency who are to render the final
decision have not heard the case or read the record, or the proposed order is not prepared by a
member of the agency.").
111. 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 2 (codified at La. R.S. 49:991-99 (Supp. 1998)).
112. La. R.S. 49:994(A), 995(A) (Supp. 1998). Al~s employed by agencies on October 1,
1996, are transferred to the Division irrespective whether they are otherwise qualified for employment
as an administrative law judge under the current law. Id. 49:994(C) (Supp. 1998).
113. La. R.S. 49:994(A) (Supp. 1998).
114. La. R.S. 49:998-99 (Supp. 1998).
115. La. R.S. 49:992(A)(2), (B)(1) (Supp. 1998).
116. La. R.S. 49:992(D) (Supp. 1998). The Public Service Commission has its own division
of hearing examiners. La. R.S. 45:1163.3(A) (Supp. 1998). As a constitutionally-created agency,
the Public Service Commission may have additional grounds for exemption. See generally Richard
D. Moreno, Comment, Louisiana's Constitutional Agencies: Plenary Powers of "Constitutional
Illusions of Being a Fourth Branch of Government"?, 51 La. L. Rev. 875 (1991). Moreno
lists fourteen agencies or classes of agencies recognized by the Louisiana Constitution. Id. at 903
n.128.
117. La. R.S. 49:992(F) (Supp. 1998).
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The Director of the Division shall promulgate regulations concerning rules
of evidence,". "[a]dminister and supervise the conduct of adjudications," and
"[a]ssist agencies in the preparation, consideration, publication, and interpretation
of rules as appropriate pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act."" 9 Aside
from these responsibilities for adjudications, the Act charges the Director to
"[a]ccessinformation concerning the several agencies to assure that they properly
promulgate rules required by law."'2 °
The enumeration of these duties suggests that the Director should take a
strong supervisory role with respect to the agencies. It also creates some
important ambiguities. For example, the Act does not state how the Director
should assist the agencies in interpreting the LAPA or assure that agencies
properly promulgate rules. The Director does not have a direct means of
enforcing her own interpretation of the law. Unlike its federal counterpart, the
Louisiana APA does not have any special provisions for interpretive rules.'
Only by custom, not by direction, have agencies issued interpretive rules; 2 2 yet
the new Act gives express license to the Director to "[a]ssist ... in ... interpreta-
tion," without defining what that means. This section may authorize the Director
to issue her own interpretations and then impose those on the agencies through the
Division's ALJs. Reviewing courts generally give great deference to an agency's
interpretation of its own rules,2 3 but who has the principal charge to interpret
the LAPA? An agency or the Division of Administrative Law?
These are interesting and important questions, but none of these concerns is
insurmountable. They simply are the kind of questions that will attend any
change of this nature. Several of the new sections in the Louisiana APA are
taken verbatim, or nearly so, from the New Jersey Statutes.2 4  New Jersey
118. Prior to the recent amendments, the Louisiana APA provided:
Agencies may admit and give probative effect to evidence which possesses probative
value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
They shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law. Agencies may exclude
incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence.
La. R.S. 49:956(l) (Supp. 1998).
119. La. R.S. 49:996 (Supp. 1998).
120. La. R1S. 49:996(10) (Supp. 1998).
121. The federal APA provides that agencies promulgating interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure or practice do not have to comply
with the general notice and comment provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1996).
122. See, e.g., Accountants' Ass'n of Louisiana v. State, 487 So. 2d 155 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 492 So. 2d 1219 (1986).
123. See J. Ray McDermott, Inc. v. Morrison, 705 So. 2d 195, 205 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997),
writ denied, 709 So. 2d 753 (1998); Earles v. State Bd. of Cert. Pub. Accountants, 665 So. 2d 1288,
1290 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995), writ denied, 669 So. 2d 397 (1996); In re Recovery 1, Inc., 635 So.
2d 690, 696 (La App. I st Cir.), writ denied, 639 So. 2d 1169 (1994). See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2278 (1984).
124. For example, the LAPA's section 996 is taken from the New Jersey Code, Title 52, section
14F-5. N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:14F-5a-b, d-k (West Supp. 1998). Section 997 of the LAPA is taken from
New Jersey Code, Title 52, section 14F-5s.
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courts have addressed some of these questions, and the Louisiana courts may find
New Jersey's reasoning persuasive. For example, one New Jersey court found
that the grant to the director of the equivalent of Louisiana's Division of
Administrative Law had been given "broad authority" to develop uniform
standards, rules and procedures.' The New Jersey Supreme Court has
affirmed the director's authority but subject to the caveat that the office may not
adopt rules that will frustrate the essential "decisional authority of the agency
itself and thereby undermine its ultimate regulatory responsibilities."' 26 These
cases suggest one good, common sense approach to understanding Louisiana's
move to a central panel. Under the new Act, the Director of the Division of
Administrative Law has been charged with prescribing uniform rules that can be
applied by a corps of ALJs that the Director must employ, assign, and evaluate.
The Director's immediate interest is the uniform application of the LAPA, and
the Legislature has committed the interpretation of the procedures set forth in
that Act within her control. Once the Director prescribes those uniform rules,
the courts should defer to the Director's interpretation of the LAPA. On the
other hand, and notwithstanding the fact that the Act instructs the Director to
"assist agencies in the ... publication[] and interpretation of [their] rules" and
assure that agencies "properly promulgate rules required by law,"' 27 the
principal responsibility for understanding, promulgating, construing, and
enforcing substantive rules should remain with the agencies, and courts should
continue to defer to agencies on matters within their expertise.
2. ALJs and Final Decisions
The scheme that I described in the previous paragraph is one good way a
central panel could be implemented in Louisiana. But I fudged my analysis in
the last sentence of that paragraph: I said the principal duty to construe and
enforce substantive rules should remain with the agencies. If the LAPA
contained just the central panel provisions I have discussed so far, I would feel
confident of my analysis. These changes would have put Louisiana in the
mainstream of states that have opted for the central panel system; Louisiana's
central panel would be consistent with either the Law Clerk or the Appellate
Model. But the LAPA did not stop with those provisions, and as a result, I am
quite unsettled in my assessment of the deference that the courts should afford
Louisiana's administrative agencies.
The additional language in question is short, but quite dramatic. Section
992.B(2) of the LAPA provides: "In an adjudication commencedby the division,
the administrative law judge shall issue the final decision or order, whether or
125. Hayes v. Gulli, 418 A.2d 295, 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980).
126. In re Certain Sections of the Uniform Admin. Procedure Rules, 447 A.2d 151, 156 (N.J.
1982).
127. La. R.S. 49:996(9), (10) (Supp. 1998).
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not on rehearing, and the agency shall have no authority to override such
decision or order."' 28  This is a remarkable provision. It makes an AL's
decision unreviewable by the agency itself. This means, in contrast to our years
of believing that executive agencies should appropriately promulgate and enforce
regulations, the ultimate power to interpret agency regulations and to enforce or
not enforce laws and regulations has been turned over to the state's ALJs.'29
No longer do agency heads have the ability to reverse-under any circumstances,
with or without explanation-an AL's decision. 3 Effectively, Louisiana has
created an administrative court.' 3' This represents a serious shift in administra-
tive theory. It may prove to be a good shift, but there is no question but that
this is a dramatic change.
Did the Legislature include Section 992(B)(2) because it wished to deprive
state agencies of decisionmaking authority, or did it include Section 992(B)(2)
because it believed-mistakenly, in my view-that section important to make the
central panel system work? Nothing in the central panel system requires
conferring such decisional independence on ALJs. The idea of the central panel
is comfortable, though not entirely inconsistent with the Law Clerk Model, which
requires little decisional independence since an AL's judgment is subject to
complete control by the agency. The central panel also works quite comfortably
within the Appellate Review Model, which recognizes the AL's initial decision
but leaves to the agency the final decision (including, in some cases, the duty to
explain why it disagrees with the ALJ). If the primary aim of the Louisiana
Legislature was to deprive administrative agenciesof adjudicative decisionmaking
128. La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (Supp. 1998).
129. See Hunter Indus. Facilities v. Texas Natural Resources Conservation Comm'n, 910 S.W.2d
96, 104 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995) ("Forcing the Commission to accept the hearing examiners'
conclusions of law ... would destroy the Commission's discretion to interpret the rules that the
Commission itself has promulgated."). See generally F. Scott McCown & Monica Leo, When Can
An Agency Change the Findings or Conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge?, 50 Baylor L. Rev.
65 (1998).
130. Arguably, the new section repeals, sub silentio, other provisions of Louisiana Revised
Statutes that confer final decisionmaking authority on the agency head. See, e.g., La. R.S. 26:920
(Supp. 1998) ("Decisions of the commissioner [of the Office of Alcohol and Tobacco Control] in
withholding, suspending, or revoking permits are final and binding on all parties unless appealed in
the manner provided by this Section and finally reversed by the courts."); La. R.S. 27:25(E) (Supp.
1998) ("The hearing officer shall render his decision within thirty days after the hearing is conducted.
Either party to such hearing may appeal the decision of the hearing officer to the [Louisiana Gaming
Control Board]. Such appeal shall be lodged with the board within thirty days of the rendering of
the decision and, if lodged, shall be heard and decided by the board within sixty days of such
notice."); La. R.S. 30:2050.16(B) (Supp. 1998) ("An order or decision of a hearing officer becomes
final thirty days after the last notice is given, with out a request for administrative review being filed.
However, the secretary [of DEQ] may reserve the right to make the final decision."); La. R.S.
47:1992(D) (Supp. 1998) ("All determinations by the board of review shall be final unless appealed
to the tax commission.").
131. See Levinson, supra note 5, at 238 ("the AU may exercise final agency decisionmaking
power, pursuant to delegation and subject only to judicial review. Where an AU exercises this
power, the system functions as an administrative court.").
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entirely and to vest such decisionmaking authority in an independent factfinder
(but not a court), then the central panel was essential.
I cannot find any other state that has a provision identical to Section
992(B)(2).'32 The closest provision may be a 1993 revision to the South
Carolina APA, in which it adopted a central panel system, but distinguished
between judicial review of adjudications before collegial boards or commissions
and those before single-headed agencies. The South Carolina APA provides that
review of a decision by an ALJ in a case "involving departments governed by
a board or commission" must be filed with the board or commission first. Then,
"[a] party aggrieved by a final decision of a board in such case is entitled to
judicial review of that decision."' 33 By contrast, "[f]or judicial review of any
final decision of an administrative law judge of cases involving departments
governed by the single director," an aggrieved party may seek judicial review
immediately. 34 In other words, collegial boards or commissions have the right
to review and reverse ALJ decisions, but single-headed agencies do not. This is
an unusual provision, but there is some logic to it. The arguments for expertise
in administrative agencies have always been made most forcefully with respect
to independent, collegial bodies. One commentator on the South Carolina
scheme suggests that the South Carolina scheme is "a radical departure from the
traditional central panel mode. [Flar from mere institutional independence, or
structural freedom to conduct hearings outside of agency control, which is the
defining characteristic of all other central panels, South Carolina has given its
ALJ Division full decisional independence, or the power to make final,
substantive decisions for state agencies." 13' Another argues that conferring
final decisionmaking authority on ALJs in matters before single-headed agencies
makes the "arrangement ... most like the Missouri and Maine administrative
court structures."'' 36  The South Carolina proposal has its supporters and
critics. 37
Louisiana has taken South Carolina's novel scheme one step farther because
the LAPA draws no distinction between collegial boards and single-headed
132. Professor Gifford noted that "Minnesota has experienced difficulty in deciding whether an
enforcement agency may appeal the adverse decision of an administrative law judge or hearing
officer." Gifford, supra note 47, at 971 n.14. Minnesota has evidently corrected the problem by
statute authorizing appeal. Id.
133. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The board or commission's
review "must be confined to the record." Id. § 1-23-610(D).
134. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
135. Zeigler, supra note 80, at 2 (emphasis in original).
136. Swent, supra note 80, at 13 (footnote omitted).
137. Compare Swent, supra note 80, at 14 ("This modification represents an improvement of
the first order. Greater efficiency, fairness, economy, public confidence, and quality rulings make
up but a short list of the advantages of increased independence.") with Zeigler, supra note 80, at 38
("without any opportunity for the application of expertise, what is the point of having administrative
adjudications at all? Doesn't the South Carolina system merely represent the application of
administrative discretion without the benefit of specialized expertise?").
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agencies. Any matter decided by ALJs in the Division of Administrative Law
is final irrespective of the agency's organization, function, or mission.1
3 8
Louisiana is left in the strange situation that boards and commissions that
conduct their own adjudications may continue to make final decisions; but if a
board or commission elects to send an adjudicative matter to the Division of
Administrative Law, the AL's decision is final.
3. Agencies and the Right of Appeal
In the original LAPA, agencies could not take appeals to state courts. Until
recently, Section 951 of the LAPA defined "person" as "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision, or public or
private organization of any character other than an agency."' 39 Under Section
964, "[a] person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication
proceeding is entitled to judicial review under this Chapter."' 40  Louisiana
agencies have never had the right to appeal for one simple reason: agencies
controlled their own adjudications; they had the final say and thus had no need
to appeal a self-imposed adverse decision.
141
Under the new amendments to the LAPA, an ALJ, not an agency, will make
the final decision, and yet the agency, having lost the right to issue the final
decision, still does not have the right to take an appeal from the ALJs decision.
This is an astonishing provision. There is no chance that this sequence was
legislative oversight because in 1997, the Legislature amended the definition of
"person." Section 951, with the 1997 change in italics, now provides:
"Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
governmental subdivision, or public or private organization of any
character other than an agency, except that an agency is a "person "for
the purpose of appealing an administrative ruling in a disciplinary
action brought pursuant to Title 37. .. prior to the final adjudication
of such disciplinary action.'42
Title 37 adjudications deal with state-licensedprofessionals-attomeys, dentists,
funeral directors, auctioneers, plumbers, marine surveyors, and so forth-and
were already exempted from the Division of Administrative Law. 43 In late
138. As I previously noted, professional boards are exempted from the Act, and other boards
and commissions that would otherwise be subject to the Act may elect to conduct their own
adjudications. La. R.S. 49:992(D)(5), 992(F) (Supp. 1998).
139. La. R.S. 49:951(5) (Supp. 1998).
140. La. R.S. 49:964(A) (Supp. 1998).
141. But see In re American Waste and Pollution Control Co., 581 So. 2d 738 (La. App. lst Cir.
1991) (DEQ appeal from ALU decision reversing the Secretary of DEQ from acting as a hearing
officer).
142. 1997 La. Acts No. 1224, § I (codified in La. R.S. 49:951(5) (Supp. 1998)).
143. La. R.S. 49:992(D)(5) (Supp. 1998) ("State professional and occupational licensing boards
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1997, a Nineteenth Judicial District Judge in East Baton Rouge Parish held that
the Commissioner of Insurance could not appeal an adverse decision by an ALJ
under the LAPA and that "either the First Circuit can straighten it out, or ... [it
should be put] on the agenda for the Special Session to clear ... up.',1 44 In
February 1999, as this article was going to press, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal reversed and remanded. Drawing from very general constitutional and
statutory provisions, the court held that the Commissioner of Insurance, as a
"constitutionally created position, statutorily charged with the responsibility for
regulation of insurance," must have
authority to seek judicial review of matters related to insurance
licensing, and in that respect only, is not limited by the [LAPA].
... To deny the Commissioner of Insurance the right to appeal
would mean there would be no adversarial proceeding. An ALJ should
not make a final decision which is not subject to judicial review in
insurance matters.
1 45
The court's statement is more wishful thinking or good policymaking than a
careful parsing of the statute. Most telling in this respect, the court thought it
"incomprehensible that the public official charged with the authority over
insurance licensing, would not have a right of action to appeal an adverse
decision of an ALJ involving an insurance license.
1 46
Incomprehensible or not, the idea of state agencies losing the power to issue
a final decision and lacking a right of appeal places Louisiana at the fringes of
state experimentation in administrative law. It denudes administrative agencies
of any opportunity for correction in the state courts, including the Louisiana
Supreme Court. An agency that loses before an ALJ has no recourse, even if the
ALJ's decision is clearly reversible because contrary to law, clearly erroneous on
the facts, or arbitrary and capricious. 47  Such unfortunate outcomes are the
shall be exempt from the provisions of this Chapter.").
Ironically, DEQ, which is not exempted from the Division of Administrative Law's jurisdiction,
may have an independent right of appeal. See Murchison, Recent Changes, supra note 93, at 861-62.
"An aggrieved person may appeal devolutively a final permit action, a final enforcement action, or
a declaratory ruling only to the Nineteenth Judicial District Court." La. R.S. 30:2050.21(A) (Supp.
1998). For purposes of this section, "Person" includes "the state of Louisiana, political subdivisions
of the state of Louisiana, commissions and interstate bodies." La. R.S. 30:2004(8) (Supp. 1998).
Although this definition of "person" is broader than the LAPA definition, see La. R.S. 49:951(5)
(Supp. 1998), DEQ is not the state, a political subdivision, a commission, or an interstate body.
144. Sauviac v. Brown, No. 429,833 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., Nov. 3,1997), at , rev'd, No. 98-CA-
0416 (La. App. 1st Cir. Feb. 19, 1999).
145. Suaviac v. Brown, No. 98-CA-0416 (La. App. 1st Cir. Feb. 19, 1999), at 8, 9.
Inexplicably, the court of appeal did not discuss either LAPA section 992(B)(2) (making AU
decisions final) or section 951(5) (defining "person" entitled to judicial review to exclude agencies).
146. Id. at 9.
147. See La. R.S. 49:964(G) (Supp. 1998).
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burden of any decisionmaker whose decision is final and unreviewable, but it has
been unthinkable in administrative law that an agency would so lose control of
its adjudication that it could not even have the right to appeal a decision against
it.
149
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRUCTURE
Has the Legislature in fact created an administrative law court of its central
panel? The question is not trivial. The Legislature did not say that it was
creating such a court, but in my judgement that is what the Legislature did. To
judge administrative law and practice in Louisiana from these most recent
changes, one could reasonably conclude that the Legislature has stripped agencies
of all policymaking authority through adjudication and transferred it to the state's
ALJs, whose judgment must be so valued that the courts must not even see any
competing vision offered by the agencies.
Important practical consequences are likely to follow from these changes in
Louisiana's administrative structure. First, Louisiana has effectively realigned
the responsibility between executive agencies and ALJs for findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and matters of policy. Findings of fact are one area where
courts have given greatest deference to agencies. 49 We have seen some states,
such as Florida, require courts to give greater deference to ALJ findings where
the issue turns on matters of credibility. Agencies, not ALJs, have held primacy
in their ability to issue conclusions of law.' Policy clearly belongs to
148. A court, anxious to avoid holding that executive agencies have no appellate review, might
construe Sections 49:951(5) and 49:964 to mean that agencies have no appeal as of right, but can
seek discretionary review. Such argument would find support in Section 964 of the LAPA, La. R.S.
49:964(A) (Supp. 1998) ("A person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication
proceeding is entitled to judicial review" (emphasis added)), but it seems quite contrary to the 1997
amendment to Section 951. See La. R.S. 49:951(5) (Supp. 1998) ("'Person' means any individual
[etc.] ... other than any agency, except that an agency is a 'person' for the purpose of appealing
an administrative ruling in a disciplinary action brought pursuant to Title 37 .... (emphasis
added)).
149. See Allen v. State Bd. of Dentistry, 543 So. 2d 908, 915 (La. 1989) ("because of the
agency's expertise, its findings are entitled to great weight"). Louisiana has statutorily altered this
scheme as well. Prior to 1997, agency findings of fact could be reversed only if "[m]anifestly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record." La. R.S.
49:964(G)(6) (Supp. 1998). The section now provides that courts may reverse agency findings "[n]ot
supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court...
based upon its own evaluation of the record." 1997 La. Acts No. 128, § I (currently codified at La.
R.S. 49:964(G)(6) (Supp. 1998)).
1 joined two of my colleagues in urging the Governor to veto this provision. Letter from Kenneth
M. Murchison, John Devlin & Jay S. Bybee to Governor Mike Foster, June 10, 1997 (copy in
author's possession). Among other defects, we pointed out that "preponderance of the evidence" is
a standard of proof applied to initial triers of fact, not to reviewing courts. We warned that the
tension between "preponderance of the evidence" standard and "due regard" instructions might take
"[y]ears of litigation ... to give a precise meaning to these seemingly conflicting directions."
150. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45,
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
agencies, but their mechanism for establishing agency policy in adjudication-the
agency's power to issue a final decision-has been stripped from them and
placed in the hands of the ALJs.
Louisiana's realignment of the boundaries has set up its agencies for
policymaking conflicts with the state's ALJs. An agency-take DEQ-may
establish policy through rulemaking, only to have ALJs undermine the policy by
refusing to enforce the rules, or construing the rules contrary to DEQ's views.
This may lead to regulatory chaos. As Professor Verkuil and others recently
observed: "Conferring a high degree of finality on ALJ findings of fact is
virtually certain to create interdecisional inconsistency, costly and time
consuming battles for institutional hegemony, and policymaking cacophony."''
And Verkuil's observation only questioned finality in ALJfindings offact. What
kind of discordant, raucous noise can we expect when ALJs issue final
conclusions of law and establish matters of policy?
Second, we long ago recognized that agencies may establish policy through
either rulemaking or adjudication.' The Legislature has effectively cut off
adjudication as a means for agencies to establish policy. Thus, we would expect
agencies to adopt more regulations, and more specific regulations as a means of
cabining ALJs' discretion. An increase in regulations, in turn, suggests less
regulatory flexibility, as agencies try to anticipate different variables and account
for them in their rules.
Third, we should expect that agencies will bring fewer enforcement actions
or other actions requiring adjudication before ALJs. Since agencies have lost
ultimate control over adjudications, they will only reluctantly bring them. This
suggests several consequences. One is that agencies will bring fewer "marginal"
cases. From some perspectives, bringing fewer marginal cases may be a good
result; marginal cases help agencies understand the limits of their authority. On
the other hand, marginal cases help set the boundaries for agencies, and
104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781-83 (1984); In re Recovery 1, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690, 696 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 639 So. 2d 1169 (1994) ("Considerable weight should be afforded to an administrative
agency's construction of a statutory scheme that it is entrusted to administer and deference must be
awarded to its administrative interpretations.").
151. Verkuil et al., supra note 5, at 1040.
152. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S. Ct. 1757 (1974); Securities
& Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S. Ct. 1575 (1947); Bowie v. Louisiana
Public Serv. Comm'n, 627 So. 2d 164, 167 (La. 1993) ("As a general rule, an administrative agency
... may use its informed discretion in choosing whether to establish rules, standards, or policies in
an individual adjudication rather than in a rulemaking proceeding.").
Professors Asimow, Bonfield and Levin note that "[m]ost states appear to follow the principle that
agencies generally have discretion to make their law either by order or by rule .... A number of
states, however, appear to be in the vanguard of... requiring agencies to elaborate their law by rule
rather than by order." Asimow et al., supra note 72, at 369. In Florida, for example, agencies must
presumptively use rulemaking to create general rules. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 120.54(l)(a) (1998)
("Rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion.... Rulemaking shall be presumed feasi-
ble .... ). See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedures Act: A Rulemaking
Revolution or Counter-Revolution?, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 345, 348-49 (1997).
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boundaries are important to agencies and the industries they affect. Additionally,
agencies may prove cautious about adjudicating even obvious cases because of
the possibility that an ALJ will establish policy contrary to the agency's views
and the agency will have no means of correcting the ALJ's decision in an appeal.
Some agencies may decide to send only their marginal cases to ALJs. Such
policy would give the ALJs a distorted perspective on DEQ's overall enforce-
ment policies. Other agencies, such as the Department of Environmental Quality,
have the option of bringing a civil enforcement action rather than an administra-
tive adjudication.'53 These changes may encourage DEQ to seek immediate
judicial enforcement before the Nineteenth Judicial District despite other
drawbacks. 4 Moreover, for agencies that can bring enforcement actions
before either an ALI or a court, it will bifurcate responsibility for establishing
policy between the agency and the ALJs.
Fourth, as agencies rely on greater specificity in their regulations and less
on adjudication, Louisiana's agencies will be more likely to settle cases. The
threat of adjudication, once a sword for the agencies, may become a sword for
private parties who know that the agencies assume the full risk of an adverse
decision from which there is no appeal. Furthermore, the changes may prompt
outside groups to become parties in support of agency actions. As private
parties, these groups might have the right to take an appeal from an adverse
ruling even if the agency could not, giving non-governmental groups greater
control over the agencies' litigation strategy. For example, the Sierra Club has
greater incentive to intervene in support of DEQ enforcement actions. If DEQ
loses before an ALJ, DEQ cannot seek judicial review, but the Sierra Club can.
The recent change in the LAPA will encourage more intervention by outside
organizations because it gives these organizations control over the vigor with
which DEQ's actions are pursued before the courts.'
Fifth, with all due respect to Louisiana's dedicated administrative law judges,
the new changes portend less administrative expertise and less regulatory
direction in the adjudicatory process. Central panels of ALJs promise institution-
al independence. That independence comes at some cost in agency expertise
because the ALJs are hired by a central agency and are rotated among various
agencies. Indeed, we do not expect the same level of administrative expertise
from central panel ALJs that we might expect from ALJs who had been hired by
153. La. R.S. 30:2025(B) (Supp. 1998).
154. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Enforcing Environmental Standards Under State Law: The
Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, 57 La. L. Rev. 497, 543-33 (1997). In civil actions, DEQ
bears the burden of proof and the court, not DEQ, determines the penalty. 1d. at 543.
155. So long as a party has a "real and actual interest" affected by DEQ's decision, the party
is "aggrieved" and has standing to bring an appeal. See In re E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 674
So. 2d 1007 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); In re Recovery 1, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 639 So. 2d 1169 (La. 1994); Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 627 So. 2d 246
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). "Aggrieved" parties include citizens groups organized to enjoy the
outdoors. In re BASF Corp., Chemical Div., 533 So. 2d 971 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied,
541 So. 2d 900 (La. 1989).
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a particular agency and are familiar with the agency's mission. 156 Other states
have accepted the trade of expertise for independence because, generally,
agencies retain the final say; that is, the agency, in the exercise of its expertise,
can overrule an independent, but less expert, AL. Not so in Louisiana.
Centrally hired ALJs (who, the Act states, need have no more than five years
experience as an attorney), rotated among state agencies, will have the final say.
ALJs may in fact defer to agency expertise, but there is nothing in the LAPA
that requires them to do so, and there is the strong suggestion in the LAPA
(because decisions adverse to agencies may not be appealed) that the Legislature
intends for reviewing courts to defer to ALJs. The ALJs, accordingly, have no
apparent obligation to defer to agencies. They may do so as a matter of habit,
or because of something they heard in law school, or because it makes good
sense, but certainly not because they fear correction by the agency or a reviewing
court.
Finally, Louisiana's new approach challenges traditional separation of
powers.' 57 While I will not give extended discussion to this point, there are
two different ways of conceiving a separation of powers argument here. First,
the Legislature has deprived the courts of jurisdiction. Under the Louisiana
Constitution the Legislature does not have the power to create an administrative
court, and the central panel functions as an administrative court. Article V
begins: "The judicial power is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal,
district courts, and other courts authorized by this Article."'58 District courts
have "original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters" except as "provided
by law for administrative agency determinations in worker's compensation
matters." '59 The workers' compensation exception was added to the Constitu-
tion in 1990 to correct for the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Moore v.
Roemer.' Moore held unconstitutional a 1988 Act vesting exclusive original
jurisdiction in worker's compensation hearing officers. The court determined
that at least workers compensation "matters under the original jurisdiction of
administrative bodies are civil matters which would otherwise come under the
156. See Asimow, supra note 91, at 1187 ("The strongest argument against an expanded corps
[of AUs] is based on the criterion of accuracy. Accuracy suffers as specialization and expertise
decline."); Scalia, supra note 107, at 62 (recommending that agencies hire AL~s "from within, on
the basis of observed performance.").
157. La Const. art. 11, § 1 ("the powers of government of the state are divided into three separate
branches: legislative, executive, and judicial."); § 2 ("Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise
power belonging to either of the others."). Any separation of powers argument must be based upon
the Louisiana Constitution, not the United States Constitution. The separation of powers described
in Articles 1, II and Ill do not apply to state government, and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment poses no serious obstacle to the changes Louisiana has made. See Withrow
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct. 1456 (1975).
158. La. Const. art. V, § I (emphasis added).
159. La. Const. art. V, § 16(A).
160. 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990).
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original jurisdiction of the district court.""6" The supreme court concluded that
the Act "eliminated the role of the district courts in worker's compensation
litigation" in violation of Article V, section 16.162 The court, however,
reserved the question of whether matters of "public law, similar to the
environmental laws administered by the Department of Environmental Quality
in which there is an administrative hearing with appellate review by the
appropriate court of appeal" were similarly infirm. 63 While the supreme court
has answered that DEQ permit determinations are not civil matters within the
meaning of Article V,' the courts may have to resolve that question for other
administrative matters.
More importantly, the Legislature has deprived the executive of its authority.
Agency adjudication has always been thought permissible within a scheme of
separated powers because it was adjunct to the exercise of executive power. So
long as agencies possessed the authority to review an AL's decision, the
decision belonged to the agency, which exercised executive power. The new role
for ALJs in the LAPA belies the notion of any exercise of executive authority.
Their authority is purely judicial in nature, yet their decisions are executive by
nature and tradition.
V. CONCLUSION
Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist:
A feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A
feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution: And
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be in
practice a bad government. 65
In its recent changes to the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act, the
Legislature has undermined the traditions and integrity of Louisiana's administra-
tive process. It has rendered its administrative agencies feeble. If Hamilton is
correct that feeble execution and bad government must follow a feeble executive,
then the changes have been ill thought out. If the Legislature has something
more profound in mind-that, for example, Louisiana should abandon adminis-
trative agencies entirely, or (perhaps more modestly) that agency-directed
161. Id. at 79 (footnote omitted). See also Albe v. Louisiana Workers Compensation Corp., 702
So. 2d 1388 (La. 1997) (Johnson, J., dissenting); Walker v. Conagra Food Services, 671 So. 2d 1218
(La. App. 2 Cir. 1996). Moore is discussed in greater detail in John Devlin, Developments in the
Law-Louisiana Constitutional Law, 51 La. L. Rev. 295, 314-19 (1990).
162. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 77.
163. Id. at 80-81 (footnote omitted). See Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. State of Louisiana,
Dep't of Envt'l Quality, 551 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 553 So. 2d 465 (1989).
164. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So. 2d 367 (La. 1991). See also
MedX, Inc. v. Templet, 633 So. 2d 311 (La. App. I st Cir.), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 1137 (1994).
165. The Federalist No. 70, at 471-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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adjudications are ineffective or unfair means of establishing state policies-then
the Legislature should address those concerns directly and systematically.
We have to ask once again: Why is Louisiana engaged in this fancy dance?
to denude the agencies? to enhance judicial control of administrative policymak-
ing? Under the current scheme, Louisiana will likely find that it cannot obtain
either administrative expertise or political accountability.
